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ABSTRACT 
Phonology typically describes speech in terms of discrete signs like features.  
The field of intonational phonology uses discrete accents to describe 
intonation and prosody.  But, are such representations useful?  The results 
of mimicry experiments indicate that discrete signs are not a useful 
representation of the shape of intonation contours.  Human behaviour seems 
to be better represented by a attractors where memory retains substantial 
fine detail about an utterance.  There is no evidence that discrete abstract 
representations that might be formed that have an effect on the speech that 
is subsequently produced.  This paper also discusses conditions under which 
a discrete phonology can arise from an attractor model and why – for 
intonation – attractors can be inferred without the implying a discrete 
phonology. 
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INTRODUCTION 
We sometimes think of the units of intonational phonology as discrete 
entities: accents which fall into just a few categories (Gussenhoven 1999; 
Ladd 1996; Beckman and Ayers Elam 1997).  In this view, accents in 
intonation are equivalent to to phonemes in segmental phonology (except 
that they cover a larger interval). They have a rough correspondence to the 
acoustic properties of the relevant region and accents form a small set of 
atomic objects that do not have meaning individually but that can be 
combined to form larger objects that carry meaning.  For segmental 
phonology, the larger objects are words; for intonation, the larger objects are 
tunes over a phrase. 
However, the analogy is not strong, and there are many differences.  For 
instance, there is no known useful mapping from intonation phonology to 
meaning.  (Pierrehumbert & Hirschberg 1990 point out some of the 
difficulties.)  For words, this is accomplished by dictionaries and internet 
search engines.   These technologies have no intonational equivalents.  To 
date, attempts to connect between intonation and fundamental frequency 
contours have not escaped from academia: the results to date are either 
probabilistic (Grabe, Kochanski & Coleman 2005), have been theoretical and 
primarily based on intuition, or have been conducted in tightly controlled 
laboratory conditions (Ladd & Morton 1997; Gussenhoven & Rietveld  1997). 
Likewise, there is no known, reliable mapping between sound and 
intonational phonology.  Probability distributions overlap (Grabe, Kochanski 
& Coleman 2007) and automated systems for recognizing intonation have 
not become commercially useful. In contrast, the connection between 
acoustics and segmental phonology is made by speech synthesis and 
recognition systems.  The mapping between sound and segmental phonology 
is complicated, but it is reasonably well understood, and reliable enough to 
be commercially useful.  As a further contrast, transcription of intonation 
seems qualitatively different from transcription of segmental information.  
Intonational transcription (e.g. Grice et al 1996; Jun et al 2000; Yoon et al 
2004) is far more error-prone and slower than transcription of words, even 
after extensive training.  Yoon et al 2004 found an agreement of circa 85% 
between transcribers (depending on exactly what was being compared), but 
it is notable that at each point in the transcription, the transcribers had a 
choice between (typically) just two symbols.  In a typical phonemic or 
orthographic transcription, the transcriber would attain comparable or 
higher precision while choosing between (about) 40 phones, or amongst 
thousands of possible words for each symbol. 
So, in light of these differences, it is reasonable to ask whether intonation 
can be usefully described by a conventional discrete phonology or not.  If it 
can be, what are the properties of the objects upon which the phonological 
rules operate? This paper lays out empirically-based answers to those 
questions and describes an experimental technique that can provide a 
reasonably direct exploration of the properties of phonological objects.  
Modelling Mimicry 
Figure 1 shows a simple model of speech mimicry.  It is treated as a 
completely normal speech process: a person hears speech, perceives it, and 
generates a memory representation for it.  Later, the person produces 
speech from the memory. 
 
 
The most contentious point might be the identification of the memory 
representation with a phonological representation.  But, if we cannot 
usefully predict the acoustic properties of speech from phonology, how can 
phonology claim to be part of the study of language? Likewise, if 
phonological entities are not the end-product of the perceptual process, 
where do they come from?1  This interpretation: asserts that there is some 
isomorphism between phonology, the mind, and the activity of the brain. In 
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  Of course, the perceptual process can be described at various levels of detail, and phonology is 
only one level of description.  However, for phonology to be meaningful, there must be a consistent 
description of the perceptual process that takes acoustics on one side and yields phonological entities on 
the other, because that is what humans do, and we would like to describe human language processing. 
Figure 1:  Mimicry via phonology.  Sound is perceived, stored in memory in some  form 
of phonological representation, then when the subject begins to speak, he or she 
articulates based on the stored memory representation. 
other words, that phonology can describe (at least in an approximate, 
abstract way) what is happening in the mind and the brain. 
Some linguists would deny this biological connection, claiming that 
phonology is strictly a human invention that allows us to conveniently 
represent speech patterns in a way that humans can easily interpret and 
study.  But, the denial does not follow from the invention: the self-evident 
fact that phonology is a human invention does not prohibit it from being 
isomorphic to processes in the brain.  For example, secondary-school models 
of atoms are human constructs and some ideas of basic chemistry, such as 
“valence” are as abstract as phonology, but they describe – in an 
approximate way – the quantum mechanical behaviour of the real 
underlying atoms.  Thus, linguists that deny the biological relevance of 
phonology are not doing it out of necessity, but rather, they are making it an 
axiom of the field, based on tradition, history, and convenience. 
Such a denial is a choice, simply reflecting the researcher's view of 
where to set the academic boundary. Should the field be determined by the 
behaviour it explains or by the representations that it uses?  Here, the 
intent is to study linguistic behaviour of objects simpler than words, using 
whatever representation is most appropriate.  The goal is to find the 
representation that best describes human behaviour, chosen from amongst 
those representations that might fit into the rest of linguistics.2 One might 
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 The opposite viewpoint would be to separate the object and description, then simply accept the 
possibility that the description is based upon discrete categories while the object of study might be 
continuous.  Certainly, one can operate this way in a self-consistent manner, but there is a cost: it 
reasonably hope that those representations which give the best description 
would have some analogy to the structure of the mind and/or brain. 
Models of mimicry other than Figure 1 are possible, but they lead to a more 
complex description of human behaviour.    For instance, if mimicry were a 
hard-wired part of early language learning, one might imagine that there 
were two separate parallel channels, one for non-phonological mimicry and 
one for speech that is treated phonologically.  However, such a model would 
be more complex and evidence for a separate channel is weak3. 
Assuming the model in Figure 1, the central question is then the 
nature of the memory trace.  Is it continuous in the sense that a small 
change in fundamental frequency always corresponds to a small change in 
the memory representation?   This would imply that memory stores 
something analogous to pitch, suggesting a version of the Exemplar model 
(e.g. Goldinger 1992, Johnson & Mullenix 1997, Pierrehumbert 2001).   Or, 
alternatively, is the memory representation discrete, leading to a model 
close to Generative Phonology (e.g. Liberman 1970).  These two hypotheses 
will be considered below. 
                                                                                                                                               
becomes harder to distinguish good theories from bad by the process of prediction and experimental test.  
I would argue that for Phonology to define itself by the representations it uses (e.g. to freeze the field onto 
current phonological representations) would be analogous to Astronomy defining itself to exclude 
spectroscopy or Electrical Engineering defining itself via the gold-leaf electroscope.  Should a field define 
itself by its tools, it will wither when important phenomena cannot be studied with those tools. 
3
  Most arguments for a separate mimicry channel assume that the phonological units are strictly 
discrete.  Under that assumption, any early learning of speech before phonology is well-established would 
demand a specialised mimicry channel.   However, in this paper, we are asking whether intonational 
phonology is discrete, so this assumption begs the question. 
Here, I follow common practice (see discussion in Kochanski 2006, §2) 
and approximate intonation by measurements of speech fundamental 
frequency.  This approximation is undoubtedly imperfect: for instance 
loudness and duration are important in defining accent locations (Kochanski 
and Orphanidou 2008; Kochanski 2006 and references therein). While I 
discuss continuous vs. discrete phonologies in terms of fundamental 
frequency, similar arguments could be made with respect to other acoustic 
properties.  The two alternatives for phonology are cast as hypotheses to be 
tested and (potentially) rejected. 
Hypothesis 1: The memory store is a continuous representation of fundamental 
frequency. 
In this hypothesis (schematized in Figure 2) nearby values of speech 
fundamental frequency in the input utterance are represented by nearby 
memory representations.   Further, nearby memory representations yield 
nearby fundamental frequencies in the speech that is eventually produced.  
In other words, there is a continuous mapping between input fundamental 
frequency and the memory representation, a continuous memory 
representation, and a continuous mapping on the output. 
 Absent variability, the output would perfectly preserve any distinctions 
that were made in the input.  This is not to say that the output would 
necessarily equal the input, though.  For instance, the human who is doing 
the mimicry might transpose all frequencies down to a more comfortable 
level, as in Figure 3.  
 
Figure 2: Hypothetical model of mimicry where the memory store is continuous.  The 
lower half of the drawing represents speech fundamental frequency (increasing upwards) 
at some point in a phrase.  The lines connect input fundamental frequency (left axis) to 
the corresponding memory representation (centre) to the fundamental frequency that is 
eventually produced (right axis). 
  
Utterance-to-utterance variation will limit the number and subtlety of 
distinctions that can be preserved by the mimicry process.  Figure 4 shows 
this effect.  In this example, any distinction between adjacent (e.g. the 
bottom two) frequencies is lost.  This is a real effect in language that tends 
to prevent subtle phonetic distinctions from being used to represent any 
important phonological differences.  Distinctions that are smaller than 
utterance-to-utterance variation will frequently be lost, leading to 
miscommunication and confusion.  Presumably the language would evolve 
to avoid such unreliable distinctions.  
 
Figure 4: Mimicry with variation in production. 
 
Figure 3: Continuous mappings and memory representation for a person who is 
transposing down to a lower pitch.  Compare with Figure 2. 
However, while language users are limited by variation, laboratory 
experiments need not be.  Experiments can average over many utterances (a 
luxury that language users do not have in the midst of a conversation), 
reducing the variation as much as needed.  If we do so, we can construct an 
ideal variation-free model which would look much like Figure 2.  In that 
averaged model, all input distinctions are preserved through the memory 
representation to the output, even if they are not always preserved in each 
individual utterance (Figure 4).  
Hypothesis 0: The memory store is discrete.  Intonational Phonology, 
like most of linguistics, assumes that its object of study can be represented 
well by discrete symbols.  For the sake of argument, we assume that we can 
find a minimal pair of intonation contours that differ only by a single 
symbol, e.g. H vs. L4.  Figure 5 shows this hypothesis schematically.  Under 
the null hypothesis, the intonation is perceived (either categorically or not), 
then stored in memory as one or the other of two discrete representations.  
Finally, when the subject mimics the intonation contour, his/her speech is 
produced from the memory representation. 
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  However, the argument presented here does not depend upon having a minimal pair or upon 
having a simple difference.  We will merely assume that there are a finite number of discrete memory 
representations.   We also assume that these memory representations are not so numerous that perception 
is ambiguous. 
 
 
Now, production variation will yield a broad range of outputs for each 
memory representation.  Figure 6 shows several potential outputs from the 
same phonology (each one corresponding to an instance of the same 
utterance).  Potentially, the resulting probability distributions produced 
from H and L could even overlap (though any substantial overlap would 
mean that the H vs. L distinction was not sufficiently clear to form a 
minimal pair). 
 
Figure 5: Hypothetical model of mimicry where the memory store is discrete.  The 
drawing represents speech fundamental frequency (increasing upwards) at some point 
in a phrase.  The lines connect input fundamental frequency (left axis) to the 
corresponding memory representation (centre) to the fundamental frequency that is 
eventually produced (right axis). 
 
 
However, just as with Hypothesis 1, we can average over all 
productions from the same phonology and remove the effect of the variation.  
In this case, we see that the averaged productions form two well-separated 
values, different for H and L.  However, the crucial difference between 
Hypotheses 0 and 1 lies in which distinctions are preserved.   Hypothesis 1 
preserves all input distinctions through to the output, but that is not the 
case for Hypothesis 0. 
Figure 6: Hypothetical model of mimicry where the memory store is discrete.  The 
drawing represents speech fundamental frequency (increasing upwards) at some point 
in a phrase.  The lines connect input fundamental frequency (left axis) to the 
corresponding memory representation (centre) to the fundamental frequency that is 
eventually produced (right axis). 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7 shows that distinctions between phonological entities are 
preserved but not input distinctions that produce the same phonological 
entity.  In other words, any inputs that yield the same memory 
representation will produce the same output, so distinctions within those 
sets are lost. 
This behaviour is a general property of many systems and can be 
derived from Information Theory (e.g. Gray and Neuhoff 2000 and 
Figure 7:  If the memory representation is discrete, then only some input distinctions 
are preserved into the subject’s mimicry output.  The distinctions that are preserved are 
those that change the memory representation from one phonological entity to another.  
In the figure, the coloured lines show a pair of input stimuli (left).  In the upper 
subfigure, the input distinction is preserved to the output because one activates H and 
the other activates L.   In the lower sub-figure, both possible inputs (coloured/grey) 
lead to the same memory state, so the outputs of both coloured inputs will be identical, 
produced from L. 
references therein) as discussed in (Kochanski 2006).  It can be summarized 
as follows: the memory representation must be complex enough to store all 
distinctions that are preserved to the output.  Information Theory is well 
established and is the ultimate basis for all modern communication 
technology; so, this result can be derived with mathematical rigour, though 
one needs to be careful about the definitions involved5. 
Summary of Hypotheses 
The two hypotheses yield different predictions about which input 
distinctions people will be able to mimic reliably.  This is exactly what is 
wanted because it will allow us to disprove one or the other hypothesis. 
Equally important, we have a general principle that the memory 
representation must be able to store all the distinctions that people can 
mimic.   This gives us a way to set a lower limit to the complexity of the 
memory representation of intonation based on observations of human 
behaviour.  This allows us to experimentally measure at least one property 
of phonological entities. 
Experiments on the Intonation of Speech 
The main experiment discussed in this work have been reported in (Braun 
et al 2006).  The goal of this paper is not to present that work again, but 
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  Information theory is normally applied to long messages where each can be interpreted in 
isolation.  Applying it to human speech implies that one must consider a “message” to be a sequence of 
speech that is long enough so that any context outside the sequence is relatively unimportant.  In practise, 
this means that messages should be at least a sentence long (and possibly much longer under some 
circumstances).  Specifically, it should be noted that the figures are schematic, and should not be 
interpreted to suggest that individual fundamental frequency values form a valid message from the 
viewpoint of Information Theory. 
rather to interpret it in the light of Hypotheses 0 and 1 to see what can be 
learned about human memory for intonation. 
 
 
The Braun et al experiment was inspired by Bartlett 1932, 
Pierrehumbert & Steele 1989, and Repp & Williams 1987.  Bartlett 
conducted a mimicry experiment on images, with a group of subjects.   The 
first subject would be (briefly) shown a drawing, and then would be asked to 
sketch it.  In turn, that drawing would be briefly shown to the next subject, 
Figure 8: Bartlett’s experiments on memory and mimicry of drawings.  One of the 
more common changes was simplification.  Continued simplification of a face could 
potentially lead to something like the modern “Smiley.” (Reproduced courtesy of 
Cambridge University Press.) 
et cetera.  Bartlett found a variety of changes in the drawings, but one of the 
more common changes was simplification (Figure 8).  If one extrapolates the 
simplifications forward, one might well obtain something like the modern 
smiley, a maximally abstract representation of the human face. 
 
 
 
The Braun et al experiment studied intonation contours rather than 
drawings, and it simplified the experiment by using only a single subject for 
each sequence.  (The experiment ran in blocks of 100 utterances, presented 
in random order, so that the subjectd would not be able to follow an 
utterance from iteration to iteration.)   Figure 10 shows a schematic of the 
stimulus flow.  
Figure 9: The general plan of the Braun et al mimicry experiment. Subjects were asked to 
imitate the speech and melody of each sentence, but to use their own voice.  The first 
stimulus,   S1,  was synthesized to match the subject’s normal pitch range.  Further stimuli 
(S2, …) were the subject’s own responses (after mild processing). 
Following an utterance from one iteration of the Braun et al 
experiment to the next, one sees a combination of utterance-to-utterance 
variation and systematic change from one iteration to the next.  A sample is 
shown in Figure 11.  The question arises then, is this a secular decrease or 
does it have a target?  A secular decrease might imply nothing more 
interesting than imperfect mimicry in that the subject has a tendency to 
produce speech with a frequency slightly lower than whatever he or she 
hears. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4: Stimulus 1, then Responses 1 ... 4 of the Braun et al mimicry experiment (dark 
and narrow → grey and broad lines, respectively).  The horizontal axis is time in each 
utterance and the vertical axis is the fundamental frequency of the speech.  At t=0.8 
seconds, the utterances are in order from S1 at top down to R4 at bottom.  In the 
central, relatively flat region, there is a systematic decrease in fundamental frequency. 
The question can be answered by plotting the combined distribution of 
frequency measurements from all utterances and watching the distribution 
change from iteration to iteration.  A downward shift would simply cause 
the histogram to move downward from one iteration to another.  Instead, 
the histogram gradually became narrower and multimodal.  Figures 12-15 
show the intonation of a block of 100 utterances changing over four 
iterations.  Figure 12 shows the stimuli (S1) which are linear combinations 
of three normal intonation contours.  The feature to notice in the plot is that 
near the middle of the utterance (for τ between 0.3 and 0.6) the distribution 
of frequency measurements is broad and flat: in the stimuli, all frequencies 
are roughly equally probable. 
 
 
 
Figure 12: The distribution of all initial stimuli.  Data from one hundred utterances are 
superimposed to make the plot.  Each dot corresponds to one fundamental frequency 
measurement from one utterance.  The coloured lines trace out two of the 100 
utterances.  The horizontal axis (τ) is normalized time and the vertical axis (φ) is 
frequency in semitones relative to the subject’s average frequency. 
S1 
However, after just one mimicry (iteration), the situation has changed.  
Figure 13 shows R1/S2.  The variability of the fall where τ is near 0.8 has 
decreased, and the upper edge in the middle of the utterance has become 
denser. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 13: scatter plot of frequency measurements for subject AD after 
utterances have been mimicked once.  Plotted as per Figure 12. 
After a second mimicry (Figure 14), the upper edge, near the middle of 
the utterance is becoming a density peak about 1 semitone above the 
speaker’s average frequency, and another clump is forming, about three 
semitones below the speaker’s average frequency.  Another effect is that 
relatively few samples are found in between the clumps: the region where 
R1/S2 
τ is near 0.25, one to two semitones below the speaker’s average, is 
becoming sparse. 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 14: scatter plot of fundamental frequency measurements after two mimicries.  
Plotted as per Figure 12. 
R2/S3 
R4 
 
Figure 15: The scatterplot at the end of the experiment, after four mimicries.  Plotted 
as per Figure 12.  The blue line marks one utterance’s intonation contour. 
Finally, after four mimicries, Figure 15 shows that two separate groups of 
intonation contours have formed in the central part of the utterance.   
Utterances with intermediate frequencies have almost disappeared. 
What is happening is that every time an utterance is mimicked, the 
produced intonation contour is biased towards one or the other of these two 
groups of contours.  Figure 16 shows this by comparing an early and a late 
production.  Aside from a certain amount of random variation, the contours 
approach either a high target or a low target, whichever they are closest to.  
In mathematical terms, from one iteration to the next, the contours are 
mapped towards one of these two attractors. 
 
 
 
R1/S2 R4 
 
 
Figure 16: changes in the scatter plot between early and later productions in the mimicry 
experiment.  From iteration to iteration, contours follow the red arrows: the highest stimuli 
are mimicked lower, the lowest are mimicked higher, and contours in the middle move up or 
down, depending on whether they are closer to the high group or the low group. 
An Engineering Analogy 
There is a close engineering analogy to this behaviour.   It is called the 
“Static Discipline” and is taught in undergraduate electronic design classes.   
It is an essential design rule that makes digital electronics possible.  (One 
might be tempted to suppose that an equivalent design rule evolved within 
the brain.) 
 
 
 
Consider the simplest logic gate, an inverter (Figure 17).   It is 
typically constructed out of two CMOS transistors, one N-channel and one 
P-channel.   The two transistors have complementary properties so that 
when the input voltage is high, the lower transistor conducts and the upper 
transistor is off.  As a result, the output voltage is pulled low.   When the 
input voltage is low, the top transistor is turned on, the bottom one is 
turned off and the output voltage becomes high. 
This device relates each input voltage to a corresponding output 
voltage.  Mathematically, it maps between its input and its output (Figure 
18).  There is also a small amount of noise, which might play the same role 
Figure 17: C-MOS inverter circuit. 
Apply any 
voltage 
here 
Measure the 
voltage here. 
as utterance-to-utterance variation in language.  Both sub-figures display 
the same input-to-output mapping; they just 
show it in different ways. 
 
 
 
 
The static discipline requires that any digital logic element should 
have two regions where the mapping is compressive: one near zero volts 
input, and one at relatively high voltage.  These compressive regions are 
important not so much in the context of a single logic gate, but rather for 
their effect on a large system composed of many logic gates connected in 
series.  Computers, of course, are large and complex systems where any 
Figure 18: The C-MOS inverter's input-to-output mapping.  The input voltage is 
placed on the left axis, and the output voltage is on the right axis.  Lines connect 
corresponding input/output pairs.  The mapping is compressive near the top and 
bottom where a given range of input voltages yields a smaller range of output 
voltages. 
signal that is fed into one of the pins of a processor may propagate through 
at least dozens of logic gates before it comes out on some other pin.  So, we 
can idealize a computer as a string of C-MOS inverters (Figure 19). 
 
 
 
 
Each C-MOS inverter has a mapping from its input voltage to its 
output voltage.  Likewise, every iteration of the Braun et al mimicry 
experiment reveals a mapping from the fundamental frequency of the 
stimulus to the fundamental frequency of the mimicked response.  We can 
make an analogy between the two. 
At this point, we have the tools needed to simulate a string of C-MOS 
inverters or (equivalently) a sequence of iterated intonational mimicries.  
The crucial ingredient is Figure 18, the mapping from input to output of 
each stage.  One simply considers the stages (or iterations) one at a time, 
applying the Figure 18 mapping at each step.  Since the output of one stage 
is the input to the next, we just take the output of the first mapping and use 
it as input for the second, then take the output of the second and use it as 
input for the third, ad infinitum.  The result of this repeated mapping is 
Figure 19: A string of C-MOS inverters.  We will imagine putting a voltage on the first 
input, then measuring the voltage at all intermediate points in addition to the final 
output. 
shown in Figure 20.  Each vertical line corresponds to the output of one 
inverter and the input of the next (or, by analogy) the response to one 
iteration of the mimicry experiment and the stimulus for the next. 
 
 
As can be seen toward the right side of Figure 20, this iterated system has 
an interesting behaviour: after enough stages, almost any input voltage gets 
mapped to either 0.2 V or 3.1 V.  The system gradually becomes digital as it 
is made longer.  This is the result of a series of compressive mappings.   
Each stage compresses voltages near 3.1 V together and it also compresses 
voltages near 0.2 V closer together.  Conversely, the mapping of Figure 18 
magnifies voltage differences near 1.7 V: different voltages near the mid-
Figure 20: voltages within a string of C-MOS inverters.  The output of each inverter 
drives the input of the next. 
H 
L 
1            2    Iterations      4            5           6            7           
range get pushed further and further apart.  In the limit of an infinite string 
of inverters, any input would yield an output voltage that could be precisely 
represented as a digital H or L state. This is an example where a discrete, 
digital system appears as an emergent property from analogue/continuous 
components. 
Voltages between H and L do not stay there, they move away from the 
centre towards either the high attractor or the low attractor, whichever is 
closer.  This result is analogous to what is seen experimentally in Figures 
12-15, and it seems fair to interpret those figures as the result of an iterated 
mapping with two compressive regions.   Each compressive region, after a 
few iterations, yields a dense group of intonation contours. 
The static discipline is a design rule, and as such it has a purpose.   
The purpose is to force a complex system built out of these inverters to have 
two attractors.  This allows the system to be thought of as digital, with 
discrete states.  In a system built under the static discipline, there is no way 
to incrementally convert a low voltage into a high voltage by small  changes 
because each C-MOS inverter will pull the voltage back towards the nearest 
attractor.  This return toward the attractors is crucial in real systems 
because it means that small amounts of noise will not cause errors.  Even if 
each stage of the system adds noise that pushes the voltage away from the 
attractors, the next stage will un-do the noise, pulling the voltage back 
towards the attractors.  It is tempting to say that this is the mechanism by 
which discrete phonologies emerge from a continuous/analogue brain.  It is 
tempting to see this as a victory for Hypothesis 0.  While that might be the 
correct conclusion for segmental phonology or words, we will see that it is 
not true for intonation. 
DISCUSSION 
Intonational Attractors are Slow 
We saw already that it took several iterations of the mimicry experiment for 
the intonation contours to approach the high and low attractors.  This can 
be quantified by measuring how strongly bimodal each scatter-plot of 
fundamental frequency is (e.g. Figure 15).  Without going into the details 
(which can be found in Braun et al 2006), the results can be seen in 
Figure 21.  That figure is the answer to the question “How strongly bi-modal 
is the frequency distribution?”  The vertical axis (valley depth) measures 
how empty is the middle of the scatterplot (e.g. Figure 15), relative to the 
density of fundamental frequency measurements near the high and low 
attractors.  A value of zero implies that there is only a single maximum (not 
bimodal at all); values smaller than one imply two strongly overlapping 
peaks; values greater than one indicate two well-separated peaks with 
larger values indicating increasing separation.  
 The gradual increase in valley depth from iteration to iteration implies a 
slow and gradual separation of the scatter-plots into two peaks, over the 
course of several iterations.  Recall that each iteration is a complete pass 
through the human subject involving on the order of 100 stages where one 
neuron triggers another6, so if we equate a logic gate with a few neurons, 
the rate of convergence per group of neurons (i.e. per logic gate) must be 
small indeed. 
 
 
 
 
More practically, if it takes roughly four iterations for the fundamental 
frequency to converge toward a pair of almost-discrete states, then one 
certainly should not expect digital behaviour to emerge on a single trip 
between the ears and memory.  The convergence that we see is 
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 A typical interval between neuron firings is about 10 milliseconds, and these intonation contours 
were remembered by the subjects for about 1 second.  Thus, a memory of an intonation contour in the 
experiment is preserved across about 100 generations of neuron firings. 
Figure 21:  A measurement of the bimodality of f0 near the centre of the utterances.  
The horizontal axis shows the number of experimental iterations, starting with the 
initial stimulus.  The vertical axis displays the separation of the two (presumably 
phonologically distinct) components of the fundamental frequency distribution. 
approximately ten times too slow for intonational phonology to be accurately 
represented by a discrete memory representation. 
What is stored in the memory representation? 
One should also consider which distinctions the subjects can mimic.  
Recall that the memory representation must be at least rich enough to store 
all the distinctions that can be mimicked.  A comparison of Figures 12 and 
13 shows that subjects are able to mimic fine phonetic detail fairly 
accurately.  Not only can subjects reproduce the contours that happen to be 
near the attractors, but they can reproduce the extreme contours and the 
contours between the attractors, too.  So, all this detail is stored in memory 
and is plausibly part of the phonological entities. 
Hypothesis 1 is actually the better approximation to our data, at least 
over a single iteration.  All input distinctions are carried through to the 
output, although some distinctions may be emphasized and others reduced.  
Figure 22 shows one reasonable interpretation for mimicry behaviour.  This 
model takes the view that the memory representation is essentially an 
acoustic memory, but biased slightly toward one or another special 
intonation contours.  If interpreted literally, this model suggests that 
intonation contours are stored in something like the phonological loop 
(Baddeley 1997) and the gentle bias toward the attractors is due to 
interactions with something stable outside the phonological loop.  
  
 
Another reasonable interpretation that is closer to the traditional 
phonological approach is to consider the memory to be a discrete 
phonological symbol along with substantial amounts of fine phonetic detail.  
This is a sort of “decorated object”, shown in Figure 23.  However, this 
interpretation does not carry a license to do traditional discrete phonology.  
The fine phonetic detail exists, stored in the memory representation, so one 
cannot arbitrarily ignore it.  A proper phonological theory would include it, 
would involve it in the computations, and presumably, the fine phonetic 
detail would affect the answer generated in some phonological 
computations. 
 
 
Figure 22: A plausible interpretation of the mimicry results, corresponding to an 
intermediate case between Hypothesis 0 and Hypothesis 1.  All distinctions are 
preserved, but some are partially eroded and others are emphasised. 
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Given that some fine phonetic detail is stored, the onus is on the 
phonologists to show that their computations are useful descriptions to 
human language behaviour and that ignoring the phonetic detail is a valid 
approximation. Any phonological theory that uses discrete objects carries a 
implicit assumption that such discrete representations actually exist in the 
mind or at least are a good description of how the mind works. This is a 
strong assumption and needs to be justified, otherwise the resulting theory 
is built on sand. 
We know the fine phonetic detail is used because we can hear the 
detail when a subject mimics an intonation contour.  Since the detail is in 
the memory representation and accessible to conscious introspection, it 
seems likely that the phonological processes of speech production do not 
limit themselves to using only the discrete part of a decorated object.  They 
use both the discrete part and the fine phonetic decoration, and presumably 
other phonological processes do too.  The challenge is on the theorists to re-
cast phonology in terms of either of these interpretations. 
CONCLUSION 
A straightforward interpretation of results from mimicry experiments 
shows interesting, complicated behaviour.  The existence of attractors in 
intonation and their similarity to common intonation contours suggests that 
something like intonational phonology exists.  However, the approach 
Figure 23: A plausible interpretation of mimicry results in terms of decorated categories or 
decorated symbols. 
toward the attractors is far too slow for discrete phonological categories to 
be a good approximation to the way humans actually remember and 
reproduce intonation.  To the extent that discrete phonological entities exist 
for intonation, they have only a weak influence on actual behaviour. 
Humans do not behave as if their memory representation of intonation 
were a few discrete states.   Memory certainly captures a much richer set of 
distinctions than two phonological categories, and a reasonable 
interpretation is that a substantial amount of detailed information about 
the intonation contour is stored in memory, available for processing.  
Further, this detailed information is actually used in the mental processes 
of speech production. 
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